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1. Introduclinn
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the independence of central banks.
This can be explained by the shapening of the European Central Bank in context of the European
Economic and Monetary Union, especially after the Treaty of Maastricht in December 1991.
The theoretical rationale for the independence of central banks is the so-called Rules
versus Discretion debate. This discussion pleads in favour of monetary policy rules as govern-
ments are thought to manipulate in a discretionary way policy instruments to stimulate economic
growth and employment in the short run. To prevent governments from doing lhis, this view
argues for explicit monetary legislation in order to make central banks independent of govern-
ments andlor for fixed monetary policy rules. A central bank can only fight inflation in the long
run if it cannot be influenced by directives of the government. A credible and steady
preannounced monetary policy generates a better pay-off in terms of inflation and unemployment
than a discretionary policy, when macroeconomic outcomes are dependent on the expectations
with regard to the future monetary policy.
On the ground of this debate one would expect that countries with independent central
banks should also have lower levels of inflation.
In the literature several authors have written about the presumption of an independent
central bank. Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina (I988, 1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
(1991), Cukierman (1992) and Eijti"inger and Schaling (1992, 1993) constructed indices to
compare the degree of independence of central banks in several countries. Of course, the limits of
the index approach are quite evident. E.g. the Czech central bank is found to be legally very
independent which does not mean that this central bank is also independent in practice. Actual
independence implies not only legal independence but also a tradition and culture of monetary
stability with Ihe monetary authorities.
Alesina and Summers (1990), De Haan and Sturm (1992), Cukierman (1992) and Eijftinger and
Schaling (t993) also examinecl the empirical relationship between the degree of central bank
independence and (the variahility of) inflation and economic growth.
In this study the different indices for central bank independence of Bade and Parkin,
Alesina, Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini and Eijffinger and Schaling are put together and
applied to a new group of eleven countries. (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the Czech Republic). However, the legal
indices for central bank independence of Cukierman are not incorporated in our study because of a
lack of sufficiently detailed infurmation on most countries, especially regerding the limitations on
lending. Then, we investigate the empirical relation between independence and intlation.
This study is built up as follows. In Section 2 the diftcrent indices of central bank
independence are described and applied to the group of eleven countries. The results for every
index are compared with the intlation rates and differences between the indices are explained.
Section 3 contains an empirical study: We try to find significant relationships, first, between
average inflation and central bank independence and, second, between inflation variability and
'1 The authors thank David Archer, Forrest Capie, Alex Cukierman, Lex Hoogduin, Eric Schaling,
Jerzy Stopyra and two anonymous referees for valuable comments on an earlier version. Of course,
the usual disclaimer applies. Sylvester Eijffinger and Martijn van Keulen are at the CentER for
Economic Research, Tilburg Univenity and College of Europe respectively University of South-
Carolina.3
cenual bank independence.
2. Four Indices of Central Bank Independence
2.1 The Index of Bade and Parkin (1988)2)
In their study Bade and Parkin (BP) investigate the cross-country relationships between
monetary policy and central bank legislation. They describe [he central bank law on the basis of
three characteristics:
(i) the relationship between central banks and governments with respect to the formulation of
monetary policy,
(ii) the procedures for appointment and dismissal from office of the directurs of central banks,
(iii) the financial and budgetary relation between central banks and governments.
Features (i) and (ii) are used by BP to classify the central banks according to their degree of
policy independence, feature (iii) is used for the classification as to their degree of financial
independence. In this study we do not include (iii) as this feature is less comparable with the
features used in the other indices. On the basis of (i) and (ii) BP construct their index of policy
independence. The degree of policy independence is defined by three criteria:
(1) Is the centrel bank the final monetary policy authority?
(2) Is a government official on the bank board?
(3) Are some board appointments outside government control?
After having studied the central bank laws of the eleven countries it can be concluded that
the central banks of Luxembourg (-I994), New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Spain
(1994) are dependent on their respective governments with respect to monetary policy. The central
banks of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg (f 1994), Spain (f 1994) and the
Czech Republic are independent. However, legal independence does not necessarily implies actual
independence. These results are summarized in table 1. This table shows whether a central bank is
independent on the ground of the articles of the respective central bank laws.
Tnble 1
Central B:tnk Luws: Monetrry Policy
Cauntry Cmtnrl baok trw Article(s) F5ua1 authoriq
eee nott below
Auuria Nstiand Benk Aa 19N4 4 6
Ikmrurk Nuiatul Benk of Unnwrk A.1 19J6 1, 25 (By-l~we) b
Fdend Regulatiom fir the Bank of Finland 1925 2, 16, 17 6
Hungery Act LX o( 1991 on thc Natiotul nank uf Hungery 6 6
LuammbourQ Wi Ju 20 Msi 1983 ponaM cnetion d'un Inatilul
Monóteire LuxcnJnwryco6
l.oi reótive i I'bWitot Monáuim Luzcmbuurgeoie





New Zulend Reacrve Bank of New lxalend Act 1989 8 :
~I R. Bodc anJ M. Perkin: 'CeNrel Bank Lewa end Mom~ury Policy', Densnmem of Econnmics. Univenilv o( Westem
Onn~rio. CenaJa, lknih~r 19riri.4
Norwey Act of 24 Mey 1985 rclating to Norgea Banlc snd 2
Ihe Monetary Syacm
g
Polend Acl oo Nenodowy Bank Polcki 19R9 6.2.2 ~)
Ponugel Orgsnic Lew 1990 3 g
Spain Law 30, 'Regulen loe órYenos rectorea dd Banco 3
dc Eapeiu', 21.06.1980
g
t~w 01.02.1993,'Proyecto de Lcy Autoromia dcl 2 6
Barco de Ecpula'
Cuch Republic Act on the Czuh Natiorul Bank of 17.12.1992 5.1 6
Naee: b-bank
gzgovernrneN
Table 2 gives information about the number of government officials on the bank board and
the proportion of board memhers appointed by the government.
Table 2
Centrrl Bunk Laws: Appointments oF Bank Boar





eee nole below ro)
(c)
Auaru Nstinnel Bank Acl 1984 22-25, 45 I B114
Denmerk Naiorul Banlc Act 1936 8(bY-Vw) 0 Il3
Fidand Parliement Act 1919 83 0 1
Hungary Act LX of 1991 on thc NBH 57 1 1
t.uxembourg Loi du 20 Mai 19R3







New Zealand Reaerve Banlc Act 1989 40 0 1
Nurway Act of 24 May 19R5 5, 6 0 1
Poland Act on NBP 1989 49, 51 0 C I I2
Portugel Organic Law 1990 3R 0 1
Spein IJw 30, 21.06.19R0
l~w 01 .02.1993,
5, 8, 10





Cuch Republic Act of 17.12.1992 g 0 t)
Notea: (b)
(c)
Number of Minictero (or Iheir n:preeenutivca) who heve e place in the policy board.
Proportion of mambea appoinled dircct or indircct by govemment or perliamem.
The results of table 1 and table 2 can now be usecJ to construct the BP index of policy independence. Each of the criteria in tables I and 2 can or can not appear, so eight possible policy types can be distinguished. This is summarized in table 3.
Y) The Poliah Padiament haa monetary policy authorily.5
Table 3
Central Bank Laws: Policy Types
Boolc it rwl No guveivo~eol Sume board Poleolirl Cm1rr1 bre4 PolicY rype
poóq yotho~ty offieirl oo appoiutmenta iodepeo- ceolral bro4 lype does
bau4 Duard deot of gorero~oeW type eiml
1 3 3
. - ' (e) ~ -
' - ' (b) nn -
- - - (c) Yea 1
- ~ - (d) yes 2
- ~ ~ (e) yes 3
. - - (n Yes 4
. . ~ (g) r~. s
. . ~ (L) Yu 6
ae: In column J eppoiNmcNC arc independcm of ~he govemmcnl if leu Ihen Mlve of Ihe policy bwrd memben u
eppoinled by govemmenl or padi.menl.
By applying the three criteria for policy independence to every country in the group of
eleven countries, it can he shown that policy types (a) and (h) do not exist. Only the policy types
(c)-(h) in tahle 3 matter for the BP index of policy independence. BP find the overall degree of
policy independence by a simple equally weighted average of the criteria. In other words, the six
remaining central hank types are ranked from 1(least independent) to 4(most independent) on the
basis of the number of asterisks in tahle 3. The BP ranking for the eleven central hanks is shown
in the column of tahle 4, laheled 'policy typé .
Next, Bade and Parkin focus on the relation between central bank laws and monetary
policy, looking at two features of monetary policy: the level of inflation as measured by the
change in consumer prices (CPI) and the variability of policy as measured by the dispersion
(standard deviation) of the inflation level. The results for the group of eleven countries are given
in tahle 4.
. Table 4
Bade-Parkin:Average inflation and its variability grouped
acrnrding to central bank policy type. Period 1963 - 199241
Inllatiuu rwte Pulicy VariabiGty
Couotry Pulicy lypr Prreeul Rwt~ Slaudord
devialioo
Rad~
Spain (-1994) ~I 1 8.8 ('1) 3.5 ('n
Auari~' bl 2 l.0 (q I.J (D
Hung~ry' :I 18.5 (Y) - -
LuzemMw'g (-1991) JI 3.4 (J) 2.6 (4)
New Zealend cl 3.2 Q) 2.6 (S)
Norw~y 11 5.J (4) 2.J (J)
PoAUgd 61
10.2 ( 8) 1.8 (2)
Spein (t 1994)' - - - -
FitJ~nd' J 7.7 (6) 4.1 (8)
Luzembourg (t 1994)" -
J7 6
-
( 11) 249 9 (10)
poónd hl . 2 .
pcnnurk 4 7.0 (5) 3.3 (6)
Cuch Rcpuhile il 26.2 (10) 27.3 (9)
~) Conwmer Prices, on sn ennwl bare. IMF Inlenuiiorol Financial SWiniu Vufiook. 199J, pp. 104-107,6
Ndea: CouNriea wiN an ' have policy independeM cemral benka.
al 1981 - 1992
b] 1984- 1992
cl only dau aveílable over 1992
dl I983 - I992
el 1989 - 1992
fj 1986 - 1992
81 1991 - 1992
hl 1989- 1992
il 1990- 1992
In table 4 only for Denmark and Finland sample periods of lunger than 30 years are used.
The rest of the countries have had new central bank laws in the period 1963-1992 so for those
countries adjusted sample periods have been used.
On the basis of table 4 no association can be discerned between policy independence and
the two features of monetary pulicy, inflation level and variability, regarding the BP-index.
It should be noted that most of the central bank laws in this study are relatively young
and, therefore, cannot be examined empirically. If only the central bank laws which aze more than
five years in force are examined ttle results do not change. Also fur this group of countries (Spain
(-1994), Austria, Luxembourg (-1994), Norway, Finland and Denmark) no relationship can be
found between policy independence and inFlation level or variahility.
2.2 The Index of Alesina (1988, 1989)~
Alesina includes macrueconomic relationships such as, for example, monetary financing
rules. Therefore, he enlarges the BP index of policy independence with a fourth criterion:
(4) Is the central bank obliged to buy short-term Treasury paper?
Alesina uses (4) because he sees this criterion as an additional measure for the independence of
central banks, as a monetary financing ubligation can seriously harm the independent pusition of a
central bank with respect to monetary policy making.
Table 5 shows that according to the fourth (Alesina) criterion, only the central banks of
Denmark, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, Spain (f 1994) and Luxembourg (f 1994) have no
obligation to finance their respective governments.
Table 5
Alesina: Is the central bank reyuired to
absorb exccss supply of short-term Tre'asury bills7
BP policY lYpe No Yrr
(a)
t Spein f.1994~
2 Ponugah~, Spain (i 1994), Hungary Auwria, Luxcmh.wrg (-19941, Ncw ZcelanJ.
Norway
3 PolanJ, Luxendruurg ( t 1994) PinlanJ
0 Ocnnurk~l Gxch Republic
51 A. Aleaíru: 'MacruacumrmicsanJ Poli~ica', NBER Macmeconnmi: Annual 1988, Cambridge, I988, pp. 13-52.
A. Aleeiru: 'Polilics and Businces Cycler in Induslrial Democracies Economic Pol'- N 8 l 198 6) . r..v, o. , Apn 9, PP. 55-98.
After Iha comin8 imo furce of Ihe aacond Na~a of the EMU perjenuary 1, 1994, in EU membar qake moneury fimncin8
ia no longer allowed.
n Denmark will rw1 participate in tha ~hird suge of Ihe EMU and wilh reapecl b ~he second suge for Denmark holds Ihaf 'All
of theae prohibi~iona Iagsinst moneury financing] an: already in accordance wilh eziating pnclice in Denmark.' Su~.Me: (U 'No' nw.m tha~ . cemr.l hank un nM h fn:cJ hy Sovernmem mir p.diunam m buy .honaerni
Trcaw~ry paper.
According to the Alesina index for policy independence, there are seven different types of central
banks among the group of eleven countries. The independence classification of these seven types
in comparison with Bade Parkin is expressed in table 6.
Tabte ó
Alesina types and central bank independence
BP policy type Crilerioo 4 mrt? Puteutial ceulrrl brrk IMra cmtrrl brole Alrsirr q-pe
IYVe tYpW exist'
c.) ro)
I . (r) ~ -
1 - (b) Yes Oll
2 - (c) re. In
2 ~ (~) re. 2
3 - (c) Yes 2Y3
3 ~ (n yer 3
4 - (y) Yc. 3l4
4 ~ m) rer a
Naer: (q ree uhle a
(h) rce u,hle 5
Taking a central bank thet is not obliged to finance its respective government as being
more independent than a central bank that does have that obligation, we can determine the
independence classification of central banks according to the Alesina-index of policy indepen-
dence. Table 7 demonstrates every Alesina type country with its corresponding level and
variability of inflation.
Table 7
Average intlation and its variance,
according to Alesinu centrul bank policy type.
Period 1963 - 1992
Inlluliuu rrte Policy Vrrirbility
C~wntry Policy lypr Percml Rrulc SlrxdrrA ltrnic
devirli~w
Sprin (-1994) O.c 8.8 ('n 3.5 (~
AuNri. I.í 3.0 (q I.3 (1)
LuxemMwry( (-IUV.I) 3.4 (J) 2.6 (4)
Ne~r Zealrnd 3.2 (2) 2.6 (S)
Norw.y 5.3 (4) 2.3 C!)
Huny.ry 2 18.5 (9) - -
PonuQrl 10.2 (8) L8 (2)
- Spain ( t 1994) - - -
Fd.nd 2.5 7.~ (6) 4.1 (8)






Drnmarkr Naio,ulhenk. Annuel R.non 1992, pp. 20.22.8
Cuch Rcpublic
tXnmark
On the basis of the Alesina-index, no association can be discerned between average
inflation and the degree of central bank independence for the countries in table 7. This result also
applies to the relationship between central bank independence and inflation variability.
If we only look at the countries with a central bank law more than five years old (Spain (-1994),
Luxembourg (-1994), Austria, Norway, Finland and Denmark), the same conclusions can be
drawn.
2.3 The Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini-index (1991)g)
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (GMT) published a study in 1991 on the independence
of central banks and the indices used to measure this independence. In their analysis they
distinguish two forms of independence: political independence and economic independence9l.
Because the index of political independence corresponds best with the three other indices used in
this study, only this index will be treated in this subsection.
GMT define pulitical independence as the capacity (of a central bank) to choose the final
goal of monetary policy, such as inflation level or the level of economic activity. According to
GMT, this capacity depends on three features:
(i) Appointment procedures for the members of the policy body of a central bank;
(ii) The relationship between this body and the governmenttol.
(iii) The formal responsihilities of a central bank.
These three features are then used to construct their index of policy independence. To measure the
level of independence GMT use 8 criteria:
(1) Is the governor appointed by parliament?
(2) Is the governor appointed for more than five years?
(3) Is the whole policy board appointed by the government?
(Compare with BP (3): Are some board appointments made independent of the govern-
ment?)
(4) Is the term tilr the policy buard members longer than tive years?
(5) Is there no mandatory participation of a government representative in the tx~ard?
(Compare with BP (2): Is there no government ofticial on the bank board?)
(6) Is no government approval of monetary policy required?
(Compare with BP (1): Is a central bank final munetary policy authurity?)
(7) Are there legal ohligations that a central bank pursues mnnetary uahility among uthu
objectives?
(8) Are there legal provisions that strengthen the bank's posítiun in case of conFlict with the
guvernment?
GMT measure the degree of independence of a central bank by simply adding up the eight
~ V. Grilli, D. Maaciandaro and Cn Tabtllini: 'Polilical and Montury InatiWliona and tirblic Financial Policiu in Indualrial Coumriea', Economic Pnlicv. FaII 1991, pp. 366-375.











'~~ In the qudy of GMT under governmenl is meaM Ihe govemmenl dune nol aiao parliament as ia lhe care in ihe paper of Bade and Parkin.9
(equally weighted) criteria. This is shown in table 8 where in column 9 the total number of
asterisks determines the level of independence of any of the eleven countries.
On the basis of table 8 we conclude that the Czech Republic has the most independent central
bank of the eleven countries, according to the GMT index for policy independence. However, it is
questionable to which degree this legal independence of the Czech central bank also implies actual
independence in practice.
In table 9 the GMT policy types are compared with intlation levels and inFlation variability. The
same inflation data and sample periods are used as for BP and Alesina. Again no clear association
can be discerned between central hank independence and inFlation performance. The results also
hold for the countries with a central hank statute that is longer than five years in force.
Tuble 8
Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini: Monetary policy independence of central bunks
Couulries Appnu~twuwts RelutionJup witD
guvenuurut
Stntule ludex of political
iudependeoee
1 2 D 4 5 6 7 8 9
Auarii - - - - 3
Dennurk ' - - S
Finlud - - ' - 4




- ' - -
4
S
New Zed~nd - - - - - - 2
Nonvry . . - - - - 2
Pol~nd ' - - ~II - 3









Cuch Republic ' ' ~
Tuble 9
Grilli-Masciandaru-Tabellini: uveruge inflation and ils variubilily grouped
uccording to central bank pulicy type. Period 1963 -1992
Inautiuu rute Policy VariaDility
(;uw~lry Pulicy typr Perceul R:w4 Slaodard Raoft
Deviat~ou
Spxin (- 1994) I 8.8 ('n 3.5 ('1)
New Zul~nd 2 3.2 (2) 2.6 (5)
Narw~y 5.3 (4) 2.3 (3)
Ponug~l 10.2 (8) I.8 (2)
Hung~ry 7 IB.S (9) - -
Auuria lA (q 1.3 (1)
Poland 277.6 (11) 249.9 (10)
t1) Na to be JcJuceJ Gom the Polish cemnl bank law.lo
Fioland 4 7.7 (6) 4.1 (8)
Luxembourg (-1994) 3.4 (3) 2.6 (4)
Dennurk 5 7.0 (5) 3J (6)
l.uzembourp (t 1994) - - .
Spain (t 1994) - - -
Cuch Republic 6 26.2 (10) 27,3 (q)
2.4 The Eijffinger and Schaling index (1992, 1993)12)
Eijffinger and Schaling (ES) describe policy independence, analogous to GMT, as the capacity of
central banks to choose the final goals of monetary policy. This capacity is determined by :
(i) Formal responsibility of central banks with regard to monetary policy;
(ii) The relationship between central bank and governmentlparliament in the formulation of
monetary policy;
(iii) The procedures for the appointment of the board of a central bank.
On the grounds of these features, Eijftinger and Schaling construct their (asymmetrical)




Is a central bank alone responsible for monetary policy (b), does the central bank share
this responsibility (blg) or does the central bank have no influence on monetary policy
(g)~:
Is no government representative appointed (with or without voting power) on the bank
board?;
Are more than 50 46 of the board members independently appointed of the govern-
ment?.13)
Because criterion (1) has three solutions, there are 3x2x2 possible ES policy types.
Table 10 shows us that there are five different ES policy types among the group of eleven
countries. ES policy type classification is determined by summing up the number of asterisks plus
one in table 10.
Tuhle 10
Eijftinger-Schuling: Policy types.
Bao1e it No sovenuueut Sruue hoard Potmtial Cralral baoh PolicY TYDe
~ P~Y ofricial ou rppuiulwmu cwtral bwk type dura
aaWority baok buard iudrpeudent of type exist
Ruvtrwutstt
I 2 ;
-(Y) - ' (a) no .
'ro'g) - - ro) no -
'ro'Y) - ' (c) no -
.~N) ' (d) no
IJ)
S. EijRneer end E. Schaling: 'CeMnl Bank Imlepcndence: Crileria end Indixa',l~anment of Economi-~e Reaeer~h Mcmnnndum Tilbure Univeniiv, March 199?, pp. 34-37.
S. Eij(finger and E. Schding: 'Cenlnl Benk Indepe~ence in Twclve Indualrial Countrica', Banca Nuio,ule Jd l,avnro Ouerterlv Review, No. I84, Manh 1993, pp. 64-btl.
In Ihia wbstclion perliart~cnt has alw to be included under govemuwnt.II
-~) . - (e) Yes 1
-(8) ' - (Q Yes 2
-(C) ' ' (8) Yes 3
'N~8) ' - (h) Yca 3
.(bie) ' ' 6) re. a
..(b) . - íl) Yea 3
..0,) . . (k) Yu 4
..ro) . . (1) re. s
When inflation perfurmance is set out ageinst the ES policy types, again no assuciation can be
found between inflation Ievel and central bank independence or between inflation variability and
central bank independence. If we look at the group of countries with relatively longer tenable
central bank laws (Spain (-1994), Luxembourg (-1994), Nurway, Austria, Finland and Denmark),
the same conclusions can be drawn. This can be cuncluded from table 11.
Table 11
Eijftinger-Schuling: Average inflution and its vuriubility grouped
accurding to central bank pulicy type. Period 1963 - 1992
lunati~w rvte Policy Variablity
Cowrtry 1'ulicy lypr Perceul Rmk Slendord Radc
DeviYliuo
Spain (-1994) I M.8 (7) 3.5 (7)
I,uxembourg(-1994) 2 3.4 (3) 2.6 (4)
Nonway 5.3 (4) 2.3 f3)
Ponug.l 10.2 (8) 1.8 (2)
HunBary 3 18.5 (9) - -
Auaria 3.0 (q 1.3 (p
PoU~ 237.6 (11) 249.9 (10)
New Zcaland 3.2 (2) 2.6 (5)
Finlend 7.7 (6) 4J (8)
Sp.in (t 1994) - - - -
Dcnnurk 4 7.0 (5) 3.3 (é)
Luzemb~wrg (f 1994) - - - -
Cuch Rcpublic 5 26.2 (10) 27.3 (9)
2.5 The four indices compared
2.5.1 Bade-Parkin versus Alesina
Differences hetween huth indices can he explainul hy the simple fact that the Alesina-
index ha.c une mure criterion than the BP-index.
In this subsectiun the uther twu indices will unly he compared to the BP-index, as those
throe indices match hest. The Alcsina-index is hecause uf the fourth criterion regarding monetary
financing harder tu compare with GMT and ES and, therefore, umitted.
2.5.2 Bade-Parkin versus Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini
To be able tu compare GMT with BP we have to fows on GMT criteria (3), (5) and (6).
If we aggregate thuse three criteria the outcume will not be the same as in table 9. However only
those three criteria are really cumparahle with BP.Iz
Differences between both indices are caused by interpretation effects and criterion effects.
Interpretation effects arise because of differences in interpretation of central bank laws (GMT (5)
and (tí) versus BP (I) and (2)). Criterion effects arise because differences between criteria (GMT
(3) versus BP (3)). See table 12 for a decomposition of the differences between both indices into













(q (b) (c) (d) (e)
Auaria 2 2 0 0 0
~nnwrk 3 4 0 -I -1
Finknd 4 3 0 I I
Hungary 2 2 0 0 0
Luxembourg(-1994) 2 2 0 p p
Luxembourg (} 1994) 3 3 p p p
New T.ealand 2 2 0 0 p
Nnrvay 2 2 p 0 0
Poland 2 3 0 -1 -1
PortuQd 2 2 0 0 0
Spain (-1994) 1 1 0 0 0
Spain (} 1994) 2 2 0 p p
Czech Republic 4 4 0 0 0
Notea: (NumM:r of aweriaka in columns 3, 5 and 6 of 4Me B) } 1.
Stt ublc 4.
(Numhtr of aattriaka in columna 5 and 6 of ~ablt 8} number nf awcrixka in column J of table 3) } I
- BP pulicy typc.
(d) (Numbtr of amtriaka in columna I and 2 of ublc 3} numbtr of apcriaka in column 3 0( tabk 8) } 1
- BP policy type.
(e) diRcrenct - lotal diffcrLncc bawten GMT anJ BP; column ( c) etd (d).
Table 12 shows that there are no interpretation effects between BP and GMT. This can be
explain~ by the fact that the BP criteria (1), (2) and (3) are almost the same as the GMT criteria
(3), (5) and (6) and all [hose criteria are judged in this study on the basis of the same information.
Criterion effects exist for Denmark, Finland and Poland. BP classify Denmark and Poland one
policy type higher as their criterion 3 is less strict than GMT criterion 3. GMT ask themselves if
the entire policy board is appointed by the government, while BP look which proportion of the
policy board of a central bank is appointed by the government. When less than half of the
members of the policy board are appointed by the government this is sufficient for BP, but not
sufficient for GMT. The difference for Finland can be explained hy the fact that for GMT the
political authority is Ihe guvernment alune, while fur BP this cumpriscs hoth guvcrnmcnt and
parliament.
2.5.3 Bade-Parkin versus Eijffinger-Schaling
In comparing BP with ES we have to take care of the fact that ES criterion (1) has twice the weight of BP criteria (2) and (3). Thus, we have to adjust the BP index for Ihis asymmetry in order to be able to compare the two indices.















W (h) (c) (d) (e) Ul
Auatru 3 2 3 0 I ~
fknmark 4 4 5 -I I 11
Finlsnd 3 J 4 -I I 0
Hungery 3 2 3 0 1 1
I.uzembourg (-1994) 2 2 2 0 0 0
Luxembourg (t 1994) 4 3 4 0 1 1
New Zealand 3 2 2 1 0 1
Norway 2 2 2 0 0 0
Polend 3 3 3 0 0 0
Patugal 2 2 2 0 0 0
Spain (-1994) I I I 0 0 0
Spain ( t 1994) 3 2 3 0 1 1









BP asymmcirical pulicy rypea: BP rypca ir BP I has ~wo ~imea ihe wcight nr BP 2 enJ J(b-").
FS - BPA ( BP aJjuaicJ).
BPA - BP
(d) t (c)
Interpretation effects occur for Denmark, Fintand and New Zealand. Denmark and
Finland have a lower ES classification because, in practice, monetary policy in those two
countries is determined by central bank and government together. New Zealand goes from BP (g)
to ES (blg) as the New Zealand government has final say over monetary policy although it has to
start a rather difticult proccxlure to override the central bank.
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg (t 1994), Spain (f 1994) and Ihe
Czech Republic all have a positive criterion effect because BP adjusted-policy types have two
asterisks instead of one for the 'unadjusted' BP policy type.
2.5.4 EUffinger-Schaling versus Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini
For the comparisun of the GMT-index with the ES-index we have to remember that with
GMT we can only look at criteria (3), (5) and (6) and that the ES-index is asymmetrical.
Keeping this in minJ, we can compare ES with GMT. In doing so, interpretation and criterion
tlfe~ts will app~ar. 5.~~~ t:thle 1~ for a dc~umposition inta hoth effects.
Austria, Hungary, Luvrmh~iurg ( t 19')4). Ncw "Lcal:md, Spain (f 1994) and the Czech
Republic have positiva interpretation effects, which were already explained with table 13. The
positive criterion effects for Denmark and Poland and the negative criterion effect for Finland
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ES - BP: a:e column ( ~ of table 13.
BP - GMT: au column (e) of uble 12 (xigns muq lo rcvcls.:J).
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3. Empirical Analysis
In this section we check whether a negative empirical relationship can be found between
central bank independence and inflation performance. We have used regression analysis (OLS-
method) with the different indices of central bank independence as explanatory variables of
average monthly inflation (CPI) and the variance of monthly inflation. The sample period of the
regression analysis is the period from January 1982 till December 1993. This period is chosen
because, first, the start of the stage of consolidation within the EMS was in 198214), and,
second, because of the fact that most of the countries in this study have had new central bank laws
at the beginning of the 1980s.
To investigate the relationship between central bank independence and the average
monthly inflation we regressed (OLS-method) the following equation:
(-)
(4.1) average monthly inflation -~p f a) ' central bank independence t cl
In table IS the estimations are given for the BP, Alesina, GMT and ES-inJex for central bank
independence. T-values uf cunstant and the coefticient for the different indices are in parentheses.
Moreover, we considered the group of countries where the central bank laws are older than five
years (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Luxemtwurg (-1994), Norway and Spain (-1994). One should
note, however, that all results in this table must be carefully interpreted as the number of degrees
of freedom is limited (9 respective 4).
~~) H. Ungerer: 'The EMS, 1979-1490, Policies-Evolmion-Oullook', Knniunktumolilik, VoI. J6, Hefl 6, 1990, pp. ;29-362.ls
Table IS
Inflation level and lhe
indicr.c of crnlr~l b~nk indrprndrncrls)
F.xp4malory rrrirblr~ 1982 - 1993 1982 -1993



















Eijffinger end Schaling (ES) 0.004561 -0.0008
(0.493) (- 1.817)'
R~ 0.029452 0.452329
ole: t-valuea sre in pan:nthescs. One anerisk indícatea thu the ccefficien is significmlly diRerenl from uro at a 90A
confidence level and two ealeriaks indicale thal lhe ccenicient ie significant n a 9S!ó confidence level.
From the second column of table IS can be concluded that there is no significant negative
relation between central bank independence and average inflation. For BP, Alesina and ES there is
even a positive aJ-coefticient, although this coefficient is not significant.
This does not correspond with the empirical results found in studies for other countries. De Haan
and Sturm (1992), Cukierman (I992), Alesina and Summers (1993) and Eijffinger and Schaling
(1994)tb) all discover a signiticant negative relationship hetween average inFlation and central
bank independence.
The results in Ihe second culumn correspond with the results in section 2, where also no
clear association could be discerned between average intlation and central bank independence.
The third column of teble IS gives the empirical results for the countries with relatively
older central bank laws. For this group of countries the t-values of the at coefticient for GMT
and ES are signiticantly different frum zero at a 90`~ contidence level. So the inverse relationship
brtween central bank independence and level of intlation is not strongly confirmed. The difference
betwrrn on the one hand BP and Alesina and on the other hand GMT and ES can perhaps be
explained by the fact that the latter indices are broader, i. e. GMT and ES are more precise in the
determination of central hank independence.
ts)
I61
Sourec: Dauslroam, mnmhly consumcr pricee I 11982 - 12~ 1993.
Fur New Zealand only quancrly dxta werc aveilehle, f x Puland in0uion dau xuned in II1988.
1. de Hean and 1. E. Sturm: 'The Cax fur Cemral Bank Indepnnderne', Banca Nvionde del lwom Gue~edv Review, No.
182. Sepmmher 1992, pp. 305-327.
A. Alesitu enJ L. Summen: 'Cemnl Bsnk Independcn`e and MecntVCOnomic Perfomunce: Sume Cumpanlive Evidence',
Jnurnal o(Moncv. Crcdit end Benkine, Vol. 25, 1997, pp. ISI-162.
S. Eijllinger and E. Seheling: 'Cemnl Bank Indapcndence: Thcory and Evidence', fonhcoming in: Europeen lournal of
Political Econnmv. 1994.16
FIGURES 1-4
The figures 1-4 show a negative relationship between inflation level and central bank indepen-
dence for the countries with a central bank law longer than five years in force, despite some
positive outliers (Spain for BP, Alesina, GMT and ES, Finland for GMT) and some negative outliers for BP, Alesina and ES (Austria and Luxembourg) and Austria for GMT.
This can not be used to explain the difference in significance for this group of six countries and
does not correspond w the results in section 2. However this can be explained by the fact that in
section 2 different sample periods are useJ. For Denmazk, Finland and Spain (-1994) the period is longer than the 1982 - 1993 period in this section, while for Austria, Luxembourg (-1994) and Norway the opposite holds.
For the relationship between central bank independence and inFlation variability we have
estimated the following eyuation (OLS-meth(xl):
(-)
(4.2) monthly inflation variance - lip f ISt ' central bank independence t bt
(n table t6 the estimations for fSo and 8t are given in the second column for the indices of
BP, Alesina, GMT and ES. The third column gives the empirical results if we only take account
of the countries with central bank laws longer than five years in force.
Again, we must note that the results of this table have to be interpreted carefully, as the degrees
of liberty aze limited (respectively 9 and 4).
Table 16
Inflation variability and the
indices of central bank independencel~)
EYplaoatury rariables 1982 - 1993 1982 - 1993
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1~ Source: Daua~re~m, monthl coneumer Y pricca I I1982 - 1211993.
For New Zeal~nd only qwnerly dau were milablq for Po1~ru1 inna~ion deu WncJ Gnm III9NN.From the second column of table 16 no clear association can be seen between central bank
independence and intlatiun variahility. On the contrary, all the four indices have a positive 6t-
coefficient. However, Ihis coefficient is never significant.
This result does not support De Haan and Sturm (1992) and Alesina and Summers (1993),
but is compatible with Eijffinger and Schaling (1994), who also do no find an empirical relation-
ship between central bank independence and inFlation variability.
The results in the second column match the results in section 2, where no elear a.csociation eould
be discerned between inflation variance and central bank independence.
The third column of table 16 gives the OLS-regressions for the six coun[ries with central
bank laws longer than five years in force. It can be clearly seen that for those six countries 6t t-
values are negative. However, the GMT t-value alone is significantly different from zero. In other
words, the negative relationship between central bank índependence and the variability of inflation
is only clear for the GMT index.
FIGURES 5 - 8
Figures 5- 8 show negative associations between intlation variability and central bank
independence with positive outliers fur Denmark and Spain and a negative outlier for Luxem-
bourg. The fact that Luxemhourg has a high ranking in the GMT index can be the reason that the
GMT index differs from the three other indices.
The results uf the tigures do huwever nut currespund with the results in section 2 and can be
explained by the fact that in section 2 data on an ennual hase are used with different periods than
in this analysis. The results of the empirical studies of De Haan and Sturm (1992), Alesina and
Summers (1993) and Eijftinger and Schaling (1994) do not always agree with the results in this
section. In their respective studies these authors find a significant negative relationship between
central bank independence and intlation level, while in this section no relationship can be
discerned. On the ground of the results in this section there seems to be a positive relationship
between central bank independence and inflation level for BP, Alesina and ES in all the eleven
countries. However in the six countries with 'older' central bank laws there seems to be a
negative relationship.
Differences in the empirical results between this study and the three mentioned above can
be explained by the fact that within the group of eleven countries there are nine countries who
have introduced new central bank legislation in the past ten years. We think that for those
countries the transformation process from a dependent central bank regime to a less dependent
regime is still going on. In other words, inflation performances of the old regimes are still rather
persistent and working through in the new regimes, which makes the inflation performances more
diffuse.
An other explanation could be the fact that in this section inflation rates over a sample period of
twelve years are usul, while in the other empirical studies longer sample periods are used.
De Haan and Sturm (199?) anJ Alesina and Summers (1993) find a negative association
bc;tween central hank independonce anJ intlation vari:chility, while Eijftinger and Schaling (1994)
find no a.csociatiun at all. They come to the same cunclusiun as in this section: there is apparently
no significant negative associatiun between centrel bank independence and inflation variability. For
the whole group of eleven cuuntries there seems to be a positive association while for the group of
six countries there seems tu he, accurding to uur study, a negative association.
Differences hetween De Haan and Sturm (1992) and Alesina and Summers (1993) on one
side and Eíjffinger and Schaling (1994) and this study on the other side can be explained by the
fact that the tirst two studies use intlatiun data on an annual base and the last two studies inflation
data on a monthly base. Moreover, the sample periods of the first two studies are longer than the
latter.18
4. Conclusion
In this study the independence of central banks in eleven countries is examined with four
indices. Furthermore, we have tried to find an empirical relationship between the degree of central
bank independence and respectively level and variability of inflation. In section 2 no association
could be discerned between independence and level or variability of inflation. Those results are
confirmed by the regression analysis in section 3. The fact that we also consider the group of
countries with central bank laws more than five years old, does not alter the results in section 2.
In section 3 for this group of six countries the negative relationship between central bank
independence and respectively level and variability of inflation cannot strongly be confirmed.
Thus, the well-known negative relation between central bank independence and inflation perform-
ance cannot be amfirmuJ tiir uur group of cuunlries. Huwever the results in section 3 tiir tho
group of six countries shuw that an empirical relatiunship dues exist.
Bade and Parkin ( 1988), Alesina ( 1988, 1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991),
Cukierman (1992) and Eijftinger and Schaling 1993) find in their respective studies a negative
association between central bank independence and level of inFlation. However, they find no
relationship between central hank independence and variability of intlation.
Empirical studies of De Haan and Sturm (1992) and Alesina and Summers (1993) find a
negative relationship between central bank independence and respectively the level of inflation and
variability of inflation. Eijffinger and Schaling (1994) also find a negative relation between
independence and level of inflation, but no relation for independence and inflation variability.
Differences between the (empirical) literature and this study can be explained by several
facts: (i) in this study a new group of countries is examined; (ii) nine of the eleven countries in
this study have had new central bank laws in the past ten years ; and (iii) the time periods which
have been examined in our study are shorter than in the other studies. As stressed in the
introduction of our study, the limits of the index approach are quite evident. Legal independence
of the central bank is a necessary but no sufticient condition tur actual independence. Actual
independence also implies a tradition and culture of monetary stability with the policy makers.
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Appendix
Central Bank Laws in Eleven Countries
A. 1 Austria
The first Austrian central bank, the 'Priviligirte oesterreichische National-Bank', dales trum I81G.
In 1878 this Bank became the Austro-Hungarian Bank. After the First World War the Austro-Hunganan
Bank ceased to exist and was followed up by [he 'Oesterraichische Nationalbank'. Austria wac annexed hy
Naà-Germany in 1939 and from that time on the Bank wa} disrtwntled but this prcxess wasn't cumpleted
before the end of the Second World War. To support Austrian independcnce, the Austrian National Bank
resumad its activities in 1945. New sWtutes wero adopted for the central bank in 1955. The currcnt e:enlral
bank law of Austria came in force into 1984 and was hased on the 1955 law.
The Austrian National Bank is a joint stock company. Tasks and organisation are widely descrihed
in tlte statute of 1984. The primary objective of the Bank is price stability, what can be concluded from
articte 2(3); 'It (the Austrian National Bank) shall ensure with all means at its disposal that the value of Ihe
Austrian currency is maintained with regard both to its domestic purchasing power and to iW relationship21
witó stable foreign cunencies.'
'In determining the general lines of monetary and credit policy to be followed by the Austrian Natiooal
Bank in this field for the purpose of performing the functions íncumbent upon it, due regard shall be paid to
the economic policy of the Federal Govemment'ISl i.e. the Austrian Govemment has no right to give
instructions to the Bank. This is confirmeJ in article 41(2) thal says that the Federal Republic isn't allowod
lo take measures that could in one way or another hinder the centnl bank in the execution of its legal
objactives.
The Austrian central bank is, as statecl above, independent of the Federal govemment but in
practice the Bank takes an active part in the development of economic policy and co-0perates closely with
the Austrian govemment. Other tasks of the central bank are regulating the circulation of money, attending
to the settlement of paymen[s with foreign countries and according to the Foreign Exchange Acl the Bank is
the Austrian foreign exchange authority .
The goveming balies of the Austrian National Bank are the General Meeting, the Governing Board
and the Bosrd of Executive Directors.
The General Meeting elects six members of the Goveming Board. 'For the purpose of the election of six
members of the Goveming Board by lhe General Meeling, shareholders other than the Federal Republic
may propose one person for each 12.5 million schillings of capital represented by the shareholders. If not
such proposals are made, the right of proposal shall rest with the Federal Republic.'t91
The Governing Board is in charge uf the supreme direction and supervision of all the Bank's actians. The
Board has many tasks, like 'laying down the general directives of monetary and credit policy and giving
opinion on draft legislation in so far as Ihe latter concems important questions of monetary and credit
policy'~1, fixing thc discount and lombard rates and determining the open market policy. So the Board
can independently make its own monetary policy and has a free choice of monetury instruments. The
Goveming Board consists of the Governor of the Bank, two Deputy Govemors and eleven ordinary
members. The Govemor is appointed by the President for a five year term. He acts as chairman during all
meetings of the Board and sees to it that decisions of the Board are properly executed.
The First and Second Deputy Govemor are both appointed by the Federal Govemment for five years like
the five of the other memhers of the Goveming Board.
The Board of Executive Directors is in charge of the daily management of the Austrian National Bank.
Because Austria has linked its currency, the Schilling, to the German Mark, the Executive Directors msin
occupation is stabilisation of the Schilling versus the Dmark. The Board of Executive Directora ia mainly an
executive body but 'shall take decisions independently on all matters conceming the running of the Bank and
the conduct of the business that are not reserved for decision by the Governing Board'.211
ilre Federal Minister of Finance takes care that the Austrian National Bank acts legally and óerefore the
Minister appoints a State Cnmmissioner. The Commissioner may attend the mcetings of the Goveming
Board in an advisory capacity and is entitled to all co-operation and information from the Bank. Through the
State Commissioner the Federal Govemment can have influence on policy of the Austrian National Bank
since the Commissioner can 'raise objections to decisions of the Goveming Board if he considers any such
decision to be in contlict with existing legislation.'ZZl
The central bank cannot finance the govemment, but the Federal Minister of Finance can ask the
Bank to buy short-term Federal Traasury certificates. The total amount however may not exceed 5 percent
of the yesrly federal tax revenues.
A.2 Denmark
The 'Nationalbanken i Kjohenhavn' was crea[ed in 1818 to assure monetary stability and had the
right to issue notts. The bank became the sole banker of the Danish State in 1914 and in 1936, with the
'National Bank of Denmark Act', the National Bank in Copenhagen transformed into 'Danmarks National-
bank', the current central bank of Dennurk.Z31
~n NNional Bank Aa IYSJ, an. 4.
~~ Nalioiul Bank Aai 19aJ, an. ISU).
~ Nuiunal nank An 19NJ, an. ?0.
-~1 Ns~ioiul Bank Ae~ 19ai, an. ?1.
~i Nuio~ul Bank Aci 191t4, vt. 45-J6.
~1 'Danmerka Na~inmlM1snk, Cen~nl-Bank RespnmiAili~iea uwf Taaks', Danmarka Nuionalbank, Copenlugen, 1991, p. 7, 8.zz
The objective of the Danish central bank is JescribeJ in article 1 of the central bank law:
'Danmarks Nationalbank... shall as the central bank of this country... maintain a safe and secure currency
system in this country, and facilitate and regulate the traffic of money and the extension of credit.' In other
words the Nationalbank has to stabilize purchasing power and has at the same time to keep up with
econotrtic developments, so price stability is the main objective of the Bank.
In order to do so, the Nationalbank makes it's own monetary policy and is responsible for the tnanagement
of foreign cutrencies. Exchange rate policy itself is in the hands of the Govemment but is executed by the
Bank. Banking supervision in Denmark isn't carried out by the Nationalbank, it is csrried out by the Danish
Financia! Supervisory Authority.
The central bank of Denrnark is ruled by the Committee of Directors, the Board of Direclors, the
Board of Governors and thC Royal Bank Commissioner. The Board of Govemors of the Danish central bank
óas three members. One of Ihem, the chairman, is appointed by the King, i. c. the Govemment. The other
two members are appointed by the Board of Directors, but the Danish Parliament has a major intluence on
those two appointments. The boardmembers are appointecl for life but can be relieved from ttteir office by
the King or the Board of Directors.~41 Until now this has never occurred and dismissal of a boardmember
can be seen as an ultimate mean in case of a serious conFlict between the Board of Govemors and the
Danish Govemment.
The Board of Directors consísts of 25 members of whom 8 are elected by Parliament, 15 by the
Board itself and the last two members are appointed by the Minister of Economic Affairs. The Boanl of
Directors has administrative and advisory capacities.
The Committee of Directors has seven members; two who are appointecl by the Minister of
Economic Affairs and five elected out of the Board of Directors by the Board of Directors. The Committee
has an intemtediate position between the Board of Govemors and the Board of Directors.
The Minister of Trade, Industry and Shipping in his capacity of Royal Bank Commissioner sees to
it that the Nationalbatilc carries out its duties. He presides the meetings of the Board of Directors and attends
the meetings of the Board of Govemors. The Commissioner is the formal contact between the Danish
Govemment and the Danish central bank.
The Board of Govemon is responsible for monetary policy making, which is clearly stated in the
central bank law; 'The Board of Governors shall fix the rate of discount and [he rate of interest for
advances'.~1 In changing those rates the Govemors have to inform the Royal Bank Commissioner and
the Minister of Finance, but the final decision rests with them.
In practice monetary policy in Denmark ís formulated on the basis of co-0peration between the
Govemment and the Board of Govemors. The Danish Govemment cannot give instructions to the Board.
Excbange rate polícy is also determined on mutual co-operation though it is formally a Govemment issue.
The Nationalbank can give [he Govemment credit against `satisfactory security and nortnally for 1-
3 months not exceading 6 months'.261 However the Danish Government doesn't use Ihis credit facility
bacattse of the co-0peration in the field of monetary and exchange rate policy making. Instead, the Danish
Govemment finances its deficits by selling government paper on the capital market.
A.3 Finland
The Central Bank of Finland, the 'Suomen Pankki', was created in 1811 and is one of thn oldcxt
central banks in the world. Until 1868 the Finnish central bank was under the u,ntrc,l uf the Finnish Scnatc,
after this date the bank had to justify its actions to the 'Staten', the later Finnish Parliament. In 1875 the
main objective of the Finnish central bank was to maintaín a stable and balanced monetary system and to
stimulate money circulation. Ekven years later the bank also got the sole righ[ to issue money.
Finland became an independent state in 1917 and according to the constitution of 1919, article 73, the Bank
of Finland was 'under the guarantre and care of Parliament and under the surveillance of the Parliamentary
Supervísory Board appointed by Perliament.'
At the end of 1925 the Regulations for the Bank of Finland came in force. In spite of sevenl adjustments,
those Regulations still form the central bank law of Finland.271
~1 National Bank of Dennurk Act, IY37, and By-Lawa on the National Bank of Denmark, 1936.
~ By-I~ws on Nc Natiorul Bank of Dcnmark, 1936, an. 25.
~ Natioml bank of Denmark Act, 1937, an. I5.
~ '7Te Bank of Finland', Suomen Pankki~Finlands Bank, Helsinki, 1993, p. 4.23
The main objective of the Finnish central bank is clearly stated in article 1 of [he Finnish central
bank law: 'The object of the Bank uf Finland is lo maintain a stable and secure monetary system and to
asaist and facilitale lhe circululiun uf munay in FinlanJ.'
This means Ihat the Finnish central bank Jeks nut have pricn x[abilily as muin objective.
According to article 2 of the Curroncy Act of 1962 the central bank is responsihle for maintaining the
extemal value of the 'markka', the Finnish currency. In case of shocks in the foreign exchange market, the
Bank of Finland can deviate from the fluctuation margins of the markka. However, the Finnish Governrnent
can revoke this righl, after consultation with the central bank. The Finnish Govemment has right of say on
the extemal value of the markka, but co-operation in this area is stimulated by law.
There are no formal provisions which preven[ the Government from borrowing from the Bank of
Finland but normally only in exceptional circumstances the Bank gives credit to the Govemment. Also, the
Govemmcnt has no puwer to give thC Finnish central bank instructions because the bank is under control of
the Finnish Parliament. This can he cuncluJed frum article 2 of the Regulations for [he Bank of Finland:
'The Bank carries its business unJer lhe guarantee anJ supervision of the Diel (Parliament).' In practice Ihe
Bank of Finland is monetary independent of the Finnish Government but works together with the Govern-
ment - in particular lhe Minister of Finance - to be more able lo coordinate economic policy.
The policy bcwrJ of the Bank of Finland, the Parliamentary Supervisory Board, consists of nine
rnembers, all appointr.cJ by Parliament for the whole parliamentxry term (4 years). A Supervisor cen be a
member of Parliament.
The most important tack of the Suparviscm is to 'fix the base rate of the Bank and other rstes of interest
applied by the Bank and limits thereun;'2s), i.e. the Bank uf Finland is independent in rnonetary policy
making.
Three Supervisors are appuintecl by Parliament as members of the Executive Committee of the
Parliamentary Supervisory Board. The Executive Committee has to take care of matters that aren't reserved
for the Parliamentary Supervisnry Board and to prepare decisions for the Board. 'The administration of the
Bank of FinlanJ anJ managemant of the affairs are enlrustrxl lu Ihe Board of Management, except in the
case of those Juties that are raserved in these regulations fur lhe Bank Supervisors.'2v) 7ite Board of
Management must in all its actions take caro that the Finnish curroncy keeps its legally estxblished value, a.c
fixed 6y the Govarnment. Furthermore the BoarJ of Managers gives support to the Supervisors.
The boardmembers are appointed by the President of the Finnish Republic on proposal of the Supervisory
Board.
A.4 Hungary
The lnstitute of Budapest of the Austro-Hungarian Bank had the function of central bank in
Hungary till the enJ of the First World Wxr. In 1924 Ihe Hungarian Parliament esWblished the National
Bank of Hungary. After the Second WorIJ War all Hungarian Banks were nationalised and from that time
on, the National Bank of Hungary was the sole benk in the Hungarian financial system, besides some
specialized financial instítutions. On january first, 1987, the separation between central bank and commer-
cial bank was re-established. At the moment all commercial activities of the Hungarisn Central Bank have
been transferred to the commercial hanking system.3o)
These changes in the Hungarian tinancial system askeJ for a new central bank law, adjusted for the
prinriplos ol u nmrkrt r.un~any unJ wilh an ohvioux place for munetary pulicy within economic policy. On
Nuvrmhc'r Ihth 1901 thr ncw rrotnd h~mk law uf Hungary ramr in force. The main objective of the new
Iaw ia to strenghtcn Ihr stahdity ul Ihr I lungarian currcncy, the 'furint'. Thus thc National Bank of Hungary
has to pursue pricc slability as prinuuy uhje.~tive. In Joing so, 'the National Bank of Hungary (NBH)
develops its numdary Ixilicy as well as the instruments serving ils implamentation in an autonornous way in
the framework of this acL'J1) The Hungarian Government cannot influonce the monetary policy of the
central bank and 'The Government shall not give instruclions to NBH in the scope of its tasks defined in
Rolf Kulberg: 'A brie( history of ~hc Bank uf FinlanJ', Bank nf Finland, Working hper, 18.02.1992.
~ Reaula~iuna (r the Benk of FinlanJ. Hclxinki, 21 Jecember 1925, en. 17(1).
~ Reyulaiwru for the Benk of FinlanJ, Helxinki, 21 Jecember 1925, art. 16.
p~ Nnional Bank of Hunyary: 'The l.aw on ~hc Centnl Bank, Markci l.cncr NBH, 10.1 Il 1941, p. I.
~4 pci t.X on ~hc Na~inrul Bank of Hungary, an. 6.za
this Act.'32j ln other words, the central bank of Hungary is independent of the Hungarian Govemment in
mnnelary policy making although the monetary policy has to stay within the limits of the centnl bank Iaw.
With regard to the exchange rate, the centrsl bank law stutes that 'the order of detemuning andlor
influencing the exchange rates is approved by the Govemment in agreement with the NBH.J3)
Tóe central bank has to support the implementation of the economic policy program of the Hungarian
Govemment with all monetary policy means available and has to make its opinion clear about the
governments' plans and actions. So, on one hand the National Bank of Hungary is independent of the
Govemment and thus can fulfil its tasks in a balanced way in the long run and, on the other hand, the
central bank is obligated by law to co-operate with the Govemment.
The impoRant boclies of the Hungarian central bank are the General Meeting, the Central Banking
Council, the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Commission. The Central Banking Council, the policy
board of the Bank, makes decisions about the snnual policy guidelines and the modifications of the policy
instruments of the central bank, inclusive of ineasures of exchange policy. The Council consists of the
President of the National Bank of Hungary, no more than 5 vice-Presidents of the central bank and the same
number of other members as vice-Presidents. A Government representative is invíted to all the meetings of
the Central Banking Council, in an advisory capacity.
The whole Council is appointed by the President of the Hungarian Republic on proposal of the Prime
Ministec The term of the President of the Bank is six years (renewable), for the other councilmembers the
length of their term is three years (renewable).
The President of the Bank is responsible for the execution of the decisions of the Council.
The Board of Directors suppoAs the central bank President in Ihe ezecution of his tasks. The Board
has a mere advisory function. The Supervisory Commission is the supervising organ of the Bank. The
Commission is obliged to inform Parliament electing and the Minister of Finance appointing them. The law
does not say exactly about what the Commission has to inform the Minister and Parliament.
The General Meeting has numerous tasks, like establishment and modification of the statutes and
election and recall of the elected memhers of the Board of Directors. The shares of the National Bank of
Hungary are possessed by the Hungarian State. The Hungarian State iti represented by the Minister of
Firtartce but the latter cannot exert much intluence on the monetary policy of the central bank through the
General Meetíng since the General Meeting has no decisive voice in the monetary policy of the bank.
The National Bank of Hungary can finance Ihe Hungarian Govemment through the central budget
with a maximum of 3 percent of expected income of the central budget in that year. Other govemmental
bodies have to solve [heir deficit in the capital market or via the central budget.
The central bank has to justify the credit relations with public finances to Parliament.
A.5 Luxembourg
Luxembourg has known several monetary regimes since the French Revolution. First the Dutch
monetary system and during the Belgian Revolutiun the Belgian regime. Then [he German 'Zollverein' wac
in force until the end of the First World War. In 1922 the monetary union with Belgium (the Belgian-
Luxembourg Monetary Union) was instituted.
The central bank of Luzembourg, the Luxembourg Monetary Institute, was established in 1983. In 1994 a
law was adopted to give the institute a greater degree of independence, as reyuired in the Treaty of
Maastricht (1992).
According to article 2 of law of 22 cetoFter 1993 'relxGve à I'Institut Monétaire LuxemMturgexn.c',
the Luxembourg Monetary Institute has as maín task price stability and the Government has nu right of
instruction. Article 5(2) of the central bank law of 1993 says very explicitly that the Luxembourg Monetary
Institute cannot receive monatary policy instruclions; 'Dans 1'exercice des pouvoirs et dans I'acc;omplisse-
ment des missions et des devoirs yui leur ont été conférés dans le domaine monétairc, ni I'Institut, ni un
membre quelconque de ses orgxnes de décision ne peuvent utlliciter ni accupter des instrucliuns ou organcs
de la Communauté européenne, des gouvemements des Etats membres ou de tuut autre organisme.'
The Luzembourg central bank is in charge of exchange rate management, the Government however has final
authority over exchange rata policy. Luxembourg is still a member of the Belgian-Luxemlwurg Economic
m Act LX on ihe Netional Bank af Hungary, en. 45.
~ Acl I,X on the Netiotul Bank of Hungary, en. 12(2).25
Union which means that exchange rate; parity with Belgium is important, i.e. Belgium can exert indiroct
infltunce through its monetary policy on the monetary policy in Luxembourg. However, bacause of the
Unioo, both countries have to have compatible monetary policies.
Other tasks in the monetary fielJ of the institute are management of the official reserves and stimulation of a
good func[ioning payments system.
To achieve price stability, the Bank can operate on financial markets or give advances against collateral.
Article 24(1) sta[es that the Luxembourg Monetnry Institute can no longer give credit to the Luxembourg
Govemment.
The Luxembourg Monetary Institute also exerts supervision in the financial sector
The main balies of the Luxemlwurg Monetary Institute are the Board and the Council. The Board
is the policy board of the Institute anJ propares measures and takes decisions in the context of the price
stability objective. The members of the BoarJ are the General-Director and two to four Directors. They are
all appointad by the GranJ-Duke on proposal of the Govemment. The term for the fxiarJmembers is six
years anJ renewable.
Dismissal from office is only possible in case uf shown incompetence and no longer heing ahle to fulfil the
condition of 'personal honour'.
Tha Council has no policy making powers but can give aJvice on monetary policy matters. Its 3 to
5 are members appointed by the Govemment for 4 years, renewable. The Council is presided by the
General-Director of the Luxemtxiurg Monetary Institute.
Because of the Belgian-Luxemtxiurg Economic Union, the Institute can only issue a limited amount
of trwney per year. For historical reasons 'La Banqua Intemationale il Luxembourg' can also issue money,
since 1967 however with a limit of 50 million Luxemtxmrg-francs a year.
A. 6 New Zealand
At the beginning of this century the New ZealanJ economy was based on the sterling standard;
Australian anJ New ZealanJ pounds WCfe linked to the British pound sterling. Abolition of tttis parity
caused problems for New ZealanJ, as the Australian pound JevaluateJ more than the New Zealand pound.
This resulted in the New Zealand JemanJ for its own currency, what enJed in the creation of the central
bank of New ZealanJ, the Reserve Benk.
The current central hank law of New ZealanJ, Ihe Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989
replaced the Reserve Bank Act of 1964. The act of 1989 came forth as a reaction on the weak economic
performances in New ZealanJ Juring the period l970-1980. The country suffered from en expanding
govemment debt, yearly inFlation of more than 10 percent anJ an average annual economic growth of 1.4
percent. Thís strongtheneJ the belief that economic policy had to change. As a consequence, long term price
stability was given more emphasis ín monetary policy.
'The primary function of the Bank is to formulate and implement monetary policy directed to the
oconomic objective of achieving anJ maintaining stability in the general level of prices.'34~ In the
formulation anJ the execution of monrtary policy the Reserve Bank has to take account of the efficiency and
soundness of the financial system. The Bank has also to 'consult with, anJ give advice to, the Government
and such perscros or organisations ati thc Bank considers can axsist to achievC anJ maintain the economic
ohjaxxtive of mnnetary policy.'~S~ The rationale for this is that only efficient monetary instruments should
he uwd anJ thnt munrtary nnJ linanci:d stability are clueely Gnked, hecause radical changes in monelary
policy can seriously Jamage lhe stahility of the tinancial systent The obligation to co-operate with other
parties prevents the central bank of New ZeelanJ from operating in a vacuum.
The Bank is free w make monetary policy in order to achieve priee stability. By choosing price
stability and an indepenJent crntral bank the New Zealand Govemmen[ showed that priority was given to
reducing inFlation anJ stimulating r.conomic gruwth.
However, monetary policy has to he clearly aJjusteJ to price stability anJ 'Tha Minister (of Finance) shall,
before appoinling, ur reappointing, any perum as Govemor, fix, in agreement with that person, policy
targets for the carrying out hy the Bank of its primary function Juring that person's term of office, or next
w~ Rcurvc BonA ,~1 Ncw Z.nln,xl A.1 IYx4. sn. tl.
~~ Rcccrv. Bnnk ~~I' New Zenlond A.: 19xu. nn. 10.26
term of office, as Govemor.'36) Those policy targets formulate limits for inFlation for part of or for the
entire term of the Governor.3~
Also, the Govemment has the right 'from time to time, by order in Council, on the advice of the Minister,
to direct the Bank to formulate and implement monetary policy for any ecooomic objective, other than the
eeonomic objective speeified in section 8 of this Act, for such a period not exceecling l2 months as shall be
specified in the order.38) This is a right of instruction of the New Zealand Government; the Govemment
can demand the Reserve Bank to adjust monetary policy to the economic pulicy preferred by the Govem-
ment. It should be notcxl that this procedure is rather difficult, as it reyuires an order in Council, must be
made publicly known and has W be laid before the House of Representativzs.
The Reserve Bank can act independently on the foreign exchange rate market, but the government
has the final right of say in the exchange rate policy.
The management of the bank consists of the Governor and the Board of Directors.
The Govemor is appointed by the Minister of Finance on proposal of the Board of Directors for a period of
five years, and his term is renewable. He is the Chief Executive of the Bank and must see to it that the
Bank fulfils its statutory tasks. Besides the Governor of Ihe Reserve Bank of New Zealand there are one or
two Deputy Governors. One of them is the Deputy Chief Executive of the Reserve Bank and both are
nominated by the Board for five years on proposal of the Govemor. The Governors decides the functions of
the Deputy Govemors. The Board of Directors has 7 to 10 members. They are the Governor and the
Deputy Governor(-s) of the Reserve Bank and 4 to 7 non-executive directors, appointed by the Minister of
Finance for five years.
The Board supervises the Reserve Bank and the Governor and takes care that price stability objectives are
respacted. 'The Board may give advice to the Governor on any matter relating to the performance of the
Banks' functions and the exercise of its powers'79) i. e. the Govemor alone ís responsible for the
monetary policy and achieving the Policy Targets AgreemenL He himself is the policy board of the Reserve
Bank of New 7xsland.
The Reserve Bank does not give credit to lhe government because monetary financing is contrary to
the price stability objective, though it is not legally forbidden.
A.7 Notway
`Norges Bank', the central bank of Norway was created in 1816. The Bank functioned under the
central bank law of 1892 until 1985, when a new central bank law was adopted; the Act of 24 May 1985
relating [o Norges Bank and the Monetary System.
'Norges Bank is the country's central bank. The Bank shall be an executive and advisory body for
monetary, credit and foreign exchange policy. It shall issue banknotes and coins, promote an efficient
payments system domestically as well as vis-à-vis other countries, and monitor developments in the
monetary, credit and foreign exchange markets.
The Bank may implement any measures customarily or ordinarily taken by a central bank. To further its
objectives the Bank may engage in all types of banking business and banking services.'~) I. e. price
stability is obviously not the main objective of Norges Bank.
'Norges Bank shall wnduct its operations in accordance with the political and economic guidelines
drawn up by the govemment authorities and with the country's international commitments.`~1)
In other words, the Norwegian Govemment determines nwnetary policy and Norgati Bank hati to follow that
policy; the Bank is not independCnt of the Govemment. The Governmenl of Norway has alwl an expltctt
right to give the Bank instructions: 'The King in council may patis rnutluGuns regarding the rctivttics uf thc
Bank. Such resolutions may takC the form of general rules or instrucGuns in individual caaes'.42) -Ihl.ti
right of instruction however hati to be seen as an ultimate means in c:ase of a conflict hetween the
~
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Act of 24 May 1985 relating lo Norges Bank and the Monetary System, sn. 2-3.Govemment and the Bank.
Norges Bank has to lay beforo Ihe Minister of Finance every important decision. The Bank also has
to inform the public about the monewry, credit and foreign exchange situation. The extemal value of the
Norwegian curcency, the Crown, anJ modificetions thereof, aro detCrmined by the Norwegian Govemment.
The cen[ral bank oF Norway is rospcrosihlc for exchange rate management itself.
The principal bodies of [he Bank are the Executive Board and the Supervisory Council. The
Govemor and the Deputy-Govemor of Norges Bank are chairman and deputy-chairtnan of the Board. They
are appointed full-time for six years (renewabie). T'ne oiher five members are nominated part-time for 4
years with a maximum term of 12 years.
The Board is the executive and advisory authority of the Bank and is in charge of the Bank's activities and
administers its funds.
The Supervisory Council has IS members, elected by Parliament for a term of 4 years. AII members have a
maltimum term of 12 years. The chairmun and Ihe deputy-chairman are elected emong the Supervisors, also
by Parliament, for two years.
The Council sees to it that the Bank's activities are propcrly executed.
The Bank can give the Govemment seaumal and other short term credit, with specific limits to be
stípulated by Parliament. Under special circumstances there is also the possibility for long term credit, limits
again to be stipulated by Parliamen[.
A.8 Puland
The National Bank of Poland was created in 1948 after the Second World War when the Polish
financial system was disruptet1.431 After 1950, when the latit commercial banks were closed, the Polish
financial system showeJ many resemblances with the Soviet system. The 'Narodowy Bank Polski' was, until
1989, the only hank in Polxnd. At the beginning of lhat year however the Bank became again a real central
bank as the division twtween cen[rel hank and commercial bank was re-esGtblished. The Narodowy Bank
Polski was divided anJ ratained only the traditional central bank objectives.
Together with the re-establishment of the central-commercial bank division, the new statute for the
Polish central bank came in force.
Despite several adjustments in Ihis statute, the Act on Narodowy Bank Polski is still the central bank law of
Poland.
Article l starts with proclaiming the National Bank of Poland as the central bank of the country
with tasks like issue of monay, central clearing and credit institution as well as central banking institution
for foreign exchange control.
The main objectives of the Bank are 'issuing legal tender of lhe Repuhlic of Poland, grenling refinancing
credits to other banks, accepting deposits, carrying out monetary settlements, organizing operations in
foreign currencies in accordance with provisions ofthe Foreign Exchange Control Law, performing banking
services for the state hudget and other activities as provided in the present act.'~l By this last task can be
understood the supervisinn nn the tinancial sector.
The primary objective of the Polish central bank is aimed especially at strengthening the Polish currency.
Extemal stability rather than price stahility has priority wi[hin the central bank.451
The Bank co-operates in the forming and execution of the economic policy of the Govemment, within it's
range of pussibilities end according to acts and resolutions of the Sejm (Parliament). This tneans that the
Polish Parliament has inFluence [hrough economic policy on the central bank. 'Within the range of its
activities the Natíonal Bank of Poland initiates and forms monetary policy including also foreign exchange
policy, according to lhe recommendations of the Sejm' ~1 1. e. the Polish Parliament has also diract
inFluence on the Bank's monetary pulicy.





Thc huuory of the ccmrel bank in PulnnJ ix aetually longer Ihan 194g. The first bank Polfilling thia funetion in Poland - the
Bnnk of Poland - was cxtnblishad in 1924.
Act on Nanxlowy Bank Polaki, 19a9, an. 6.1.
h ahould, howcvcr, bc mtnlionaJ thal ihc real xlronglh of dumesiic cumrw'y via-l-via other eurrencies dependa maidy on
conlrolling 1hc kvel of innaliun. So, pricc atahility playa en imponanl mle in NBP policy, dlhough il ia nol ao explicil
policy goal.
Act on Narodowy óank Polski, 19x9, sn. 6.2.1 enJ 6.2.2.28
NBP and the Board of Management.
The President is appointed by the Sejm on proposal of the President of the Polish Republic for a[erm of 6
years and he is in charge of thn management of the Bank.
Co-operation between the Bank, Parliament and Govemment is stimulated by Iaw as the President of NBP
takes part in meetings of Parliament and the Council of Ministers.
The Deputy Presidents are appointcxl by the President of the Republic at a motion of the President of NBP.
Members of the Board of Management are the President and Deputy Presidents of NBP and other
members, directly nominated by the president of the Polish central bank. Nor ttte Polish govemment nor the
Sejm (Parliament of Poland) have a representative on the Board of Management. The exact number of
Deputy Presidents is not given in the Polish central bank law, the same goes for the number of other
members of the Board of Management.
The Board is the highest policy authority within Narodowy Bank Po]ski and 'considers main issues within
the scope of activities of the NBP and adopts resolutions necessary to perform tasks of the NBP, regarding
in particular:
1] . ,
2] functioning of credit and monetary systems,
3] monetary policy
7] interest rate policy,
47)
The central bank of Poland can finance the govemment by the buying of bills of exchange who are
issued by State Treacury. On a yearly ba.eis this amount cannot exceed 2 percent of the expected government
expenses.
A.9 Portugnl
The 'Banca de Portugal is the central bank of Ihe Portuguese Republic and in such capacity it sha]I
ensure the intemal monetary eyuilibrium and the extemal solvency of the currency'.4e1
Thus the central bank of Portugal has to pursue price and exchange rate stability.
'As central bank, it shall be particularly incumbent on the Bank, taking into account the Govem-
ment's guidelines, to
a) Cooperate in the formulation of and execute Ihe monewry and exchange rate policy;
b) Manage the foreign assets of the country or any other assets entrusted to it;
c) Act as intermecliary in the international monetary relations of the State;
d) Provide for stability of the domestic financial system, perfortning for the purpose the function of
lender of last resort.'49~
The Portuguese central bank also advises the PoRuguese Government on monetary, financial and exchange
nte matters, the Bank supervises the financial sector and issues banknotes.
As noted above has the central bank of Portugal ha.e no independent monetary policy authority but
the Bank is alone responsihle for the execution of monetary and exchange rate policy. Also, in execution of
these policies lhe Bank 'may carry out any operations justified by virtue of its capacity as central bank,
namely the following:
a) To rediscount and discount for a perial not exceeding one year, drafts, c,ert7ficate5 r,f ,ndcMnc~.S,
invoice statements, warrants and other similar credit instmments, under the cundition laid dnwn by
the Board of Directors;
b) To buy and sell securities issucxl by the Portuguese State;
e) To grant loans to credit and quaci-banking institutions fur a pericxl not ezcer,tling one year...'.5oi
The important bodies of the Banco de Portugal are the Govemor, the Boanl of Directors, the Board
of Auditors and the Advisory Board.
~~ Acr on Narodowy Bank Wilxki, 19K9, an. 49.
~ Ora~nic Law o( rhe Banco dc Ponuyel, Approvcd by Decrce-Law Nu. 3J7190 of 0.wber 1990, ert. 3.
~ Ory~nic Law of Ihe Banco de Ponug~l, Appmved by Decree-L~w No. 337190 of 0.rober 1990, ~n. 18.
~ Oryanic l.aw of Ute táanco de Punugal, Appnwed 6y Decrce-l~w Nu. 337190 of (kwber 1990, ~n. 35.29
The Governor has to represent the Bank, act on behalf of the central bank with foreign or international
institutioos and to supervise the Board of Directors. Like the members of the Board of Diroctors, the
Govemor is appointed by the council of ministers on proposal of the Minister of Finance for a rwowable
term of five years. He has the power to suspend those decisions of the Board of Directors or by executive
committoes 6e judges contrary to the law, the country or the central bank. However, such a suepeasion has
to be supported by [he council of ministers wi[hin IS days, otherwise the suspension ceases to exist.
Tha Board of Directors consists of the Govemor of the Portuguese centra) bank, one or two Doputy
Govemors of the Bank and three to five Directors. The Board of Directora is reaponsible for all actions
needad to achieve the objectives of the Bank that are not within the competeaco of other bodias of the Banlc.
From this follows that the Board is responsible for the price stability objoctiva. The Board of Dirnctora
caa delegate powers to executive committees. In practice, there are regular meatings between the Board and
the Minister of Finance, the members of the Board can however not receive monetary policy instructions.
Tho Board of Auditors has four members. Three are appointed by the Minisler of Finance and otx
by the etnployeea of the Bank. The main task of the Boerd of Auditors is financial supervision on the centnl
batilc of Portugal.
The Advisory Board gives its opinion on the year statement of the Bank and on matters laid before
the advisors by the Board of Directors.
'The State may resurt to an account, frce of charge, opened with the Bank whose debit balance
shall not excoed 10 percent of the current revenue collected in the previous year.'Stl Monetary firuncing
ie possible because 'the Bank shall not grant credit to the State nor any other public-law juridical peraon
except through the underwríting of treasury bills under temts agreed between tite Finance Ministry and the
Batilc with due observance of legal ceilings.521
Because of the Treaty of Maastricht is should be noted that the central bank Iaw of Portugal óas to
be modified to fulfil the conditions for an economic and monetary union in Europe as laid down in the
Treaty. In order to meet the requirements of the treaty of Maastricht, the Banco de Portugal tus to become
indepeadent of the Portuguese Govemment.
A.10 Spain
The predecessor of the curren[ Spanish centrel bank, the 'Banco de EspaaSa', was the Bank of San
Carlos, arected in 1782. This bank merged with the Bank of Isabel 1[ in 1847 aod becsme tha New Spanisó
Bank of San Femardo. With the first bank law in Spain, 1856, the name of this bank changed into 'Banco
da Espaha'. The Bank of Spain was nationalised in 1962 and then this ban{t became the central bank of
Spain.
In 1980 a new statute for the Spanish central bank was adopted; tasks of the Bank wero redefined
and the Bsnlc's independence was strengthened.
The preseat day statute for the Bank of Spain was passed by the Spanish Parliament in October 1993. This
new statute adjusted the former Spanish central bank law ta the Treaty of Messtricht.
The law of February lst 1993, which enlarges Ihe independence of the Bank of Spain, is deduced
from the Statute for the European Central Bank and the Treaty of Maastricht. Parts of the law af 1980 are
uaed, espacially about the govemíng bodies of the Bank. The major changes have occurred in the field of
Inonetary policy and financing govemment debt.
Article 2 of the law give.. the Spanish central bank control over ntonetary policy; tha Bank is
responsible for formulating and executing monetary policy with price stability as tnain objaclive. Monetary
policy however has to support govemment economic policy if Ihat policy is focused on stable prices and has
no inflationary character.
Acconling to article 6, exchange nte policy remains the government's concem, but the government
itas to consult with the Bank of Spain on exchange rate matters, with a view to avoiding any poteatial
conflict between exchange rate policy and the objective of price stability.
Other tasks of the Bank of Spain are supervision on financial institutions, promoting stability of the
Spanish financial system and issuing curroncy.
The important bodies of the Spanish central bank are the Governing Council, the Executivo
St1 p~~nic Law of ~ht B~nco de Ponugd, Approvtd by Decree-l~w No. 337I90 0( Oclober 1990, art. 26.1.
~ Org~nic I.rw o( Nt li.nco de Ponugrl, Approved by Durte-l~w No. 337I90 of Oclober 1990. ~n. 27.1.30
Commissioo, the Govemor and the Deputy Govemor.
The Govemor of the Bank is appointed by the King on proposal of the Prime Minister for one siz year
term. The Deputy is appointed for the same single term, but by the Government on proposal of the
Govemor of the Bank.
The Governing Council consists of the Govemor, the Deputy Govemor, six members, the General
Director of Treasury and Finance, the Deputy Chairman of the National Stockmarket Cotnntission, all the
Genewl Directors of the Bank and the General Secretary of Ihe Bank.
The six members are appointed by the Government on proposal of the Minister of Finance who discusses
this with the Govemor of the Spanish Central Bank. Their tertn is 8 years. The General Director of
Treasury and Finance and the Deputy Chaimum of the National Stockmarket Commission have no voting
right conceming mone[ary policy making. The General Directors and the General Secretary of the Bank
have oo voting right at all.
Guidelines and execution of monetary policy are fixed by the Governing Council. The Minister of Finance
may by exception attend the meetings of the Council, in an advisory capacity.
Daily management is in the hands of the Executive Commission. Members are the Govemor of the
bank, the Deputy Govemor of the Bank and two other members. Those two come forth out of the siz
members of the Goveming Council and are appointed by the Goveming Council on proposal of the
Govemor. The General Secretary is member with no voting right. The General Directors of the Spanish
central bank may attend the meetings of the Commission in advisory capacity.
The Spanish Govemment has no right of instmction which is in accordance with the main motive of
the new statute, enlarging the independence of the Bank of Spain.
Also, the Bank can no longer give the Spanish Govemment credit. Monetary financing is forbidden in the
new law of 1993, in accordance with the Treaty of Maastricht.
A. 11 Czech Republic
The history of the Czech financial system is identical with Slovak financial history, as these two
Republics formed one single State until 1993.
The banking system in Czechoslovakia originated when in 1918 the Austro-Hungarian banks in Czech
temtory came under the control of the new Czechoslovakian State. At that time the central bank was paR of
the Ministry of Finance. In 1926 those tasks were carried on to the National Bank of Czechoslovakia. After
the Second World War the Czechoslovakian financial system was replacecl by the communist system and the
State Bank of Czechoslovakia was created in 1950. This central bank was also the only commercial bank in
the country, besides two pre war banks.
With the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 democracy was restored in Czechoslovakia and aconomic
changes made. Therefore Ihe division between central and commercial bank embalied in law 130I1989 on
the State Bank of Czechoslovakia was replaced by the 'Act No. 2211992 Collection of L.aws on the State
Bank of Czechoslovakia' because the former could not adjust to the fast changing economic environment.
On November 25, 1992, the Federal Parliament of Czechoslovakia decidecf to dissolve the
C7echoslovakian Republic. On lanuary 1, 1993, the Czecó National Bank was created es the first and new
central bank of the Czech Republic. The new central bank law, Ihe 'Act on the Czech National Bank of
December 17th, 1992' is very similar to ils predecessor, Act 22I1992.
The Czech National Bank has a primary objective 'to ensure the stability of the Czec;h national
currency (the Crown). For this purpose the Czech Natíonal Bank shall:
a) set monetary policy; ...~531
'In providing for its primary objecaive the Czech National Bank shall be independent of any instructions
given by the Govemmant.'S4) 1. e. the Czech central bank has a strong independent position. Conceming
ezchange rate policy, 'The Czech Netional Bank shall:
a) proclaim the exchange rate of the Czech curcency vis-à-vis foreign currencies;'S5) Thus the
Bank is also responsible for exchange rate management.
In other words the Czech National Bank is responsible for the intemal and extemal value of the Czech
~1 Act on the Cuch National Bank, 17 December 1992, an. 5.
~1 Act on Ne Czech National Bank. 17 December 1992, an. 9(I).
~ Act onIhe Czech National Bank, 17 Dccemhcr 1992, art. )5.31
~urre~tcy.
Co-operation between Bank and Govemment ís stimulatecJ by law as a Govemment repreaeatative is
sllowod to attend the meetings of the Bank Board of the Ciech National Bank, in advisory capacity and the
Bank gives the Govemment advice in the monetary and banking field.
The Czech National Bank is govemed by the Bank Board. 'The Banlt Board ahall sd monetary
policy and the instruments for the implementation of these policies, and shall docide on the measures to be
takeo in the sphere of monetary policy.'S6~
The Board consists of the Governor of the Bank, two Deputy Governors of the Bank and four other amior
officers of tbe Banlc. All members of the Board are appointed by the President of the Czech Republic for a
period of six years. The central bank law stipulates quite clearly the motives for dismissal of one of the
Boardmembers, in order to protect the independent position of the Bank.
1'he Crech National Bank can give credit to the Government to help to bridge temporal budget deficits. ~e
total amount of credit may not exceed 596 of the previous year's State revenues.
~ Acl on 1he Cuch N~~iu,ul Bank, 17 0.ce~~cr 1992. ~n. 2.32
FIGURE 1: The Bade-Parkin index and the level of inflation




FIGURE 2: The Alesina index and the level of inflation
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FIGURE 4: The Eijffinger-Schaling index and the level of inflation
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FIGURE 5: The Bade-Parkin index and the variability of inflation
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FIGURE 6: The Alesina index and the variability of inflation







BANK LAW MIN 5 YEAAS IN FOACE
The Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini index
and the variability of inflation
0.07




LMI I~I ~cy fyp~.
Auslr~a
Monthly inFlation variance - 0.0000258 - 0.0000019 ~ GMT
(tí.292) (-1.636)39
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